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SURVIVING RACISM AND SEXUAL ASSAULT:  
AMERICAN INDIAN WOMEN LEFT UNPROTECTED 
 
By Talib Ellison* 
I n 1829, President Andrew Jackson promised that American Indians would have sovereignty “as long as grass grows or water runs.”1  Nearly 175 years later, President Jackson’s 
promise still maintains the hollow sentiments that it embodied 
then.2  Sovereignty, in the sense of legal autonomy,3 does not 
exist in “Indian Country.”4  Rather, tribal courts and govern-
ments lack the authority to implement and enforce laws regulat-
ing criminal offenses when non-tribal members commit offenses 
on tribal land.5  One of the most alarming displays of this prob-
lematic scheme is the incredible rate of sexual assault against 
American Indian females by non-Indian males.  
The inconsistent governing statutes and judicial interpreta-
tions of state and federal laws concerning both tribal sovereignty 
and criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country are responsible for 
the staggering rate of sexual assaults occurring on tribal lands 
between non-tribal assailants and American Indian female vic-
tims.6  Despite facially maintaining concurrent jurisdiction with 
both the state and the federal governments,7 Indian Country is a 
ward of the United States, with the federal government shaping 
and limiting tribal sovereignty within the frame of Congressional 
and judicial discretion.8  As such, the concurrent jurisdictional 
scheme prevents tribal governments and courts from having the 
complete autonomy to create and enforce their own governing 
laws.9 
This essay evaluates how the complicated maintenance of 
concurrent jurisdiction, coupled with the doctrines of limited 
sovereignty in Indian Country and federal trust responsibility, is 
effectively responsible for American Indian victims of sexual 
assault frequently lacking a judicial remedy.  Specifically, 
American Indian women face elaborate hurdles in their pursuit of 
justice when the assailant is a non-Indian and the assault occurs 
on tribal land.  This essay first introduces the historical context 
of sexual assault on tribal land, tribal sovereignty doctrine, tribal 
court authority, and the federal trust responsibility.  Second, it 
argues that an unclear Congressional delegation of tribal sover-
eignty, facilitated by the lack of adherence to the trust responsi-
bility, creates a high level of sexual assault in Indian Country.  
Third, it also argues that this unconstitutional jurisdictional 
scheme simultaneously denies American Indian women equal 
protection of the law, violates the federal trust responsibility to 
protect the best interest of American Indians, inhibits tribal self-
governance, and results in the high level of sexual assault in In-
dian Country.  Finally, this essay suggests that a decline in sex-
ual assault rates in Indian Country will occur if the United States 
adheres to the true nature of the federal trust responsibility by 
sincerely re-evaluating the dependent sovereignty status of In-
dian nations as related to concurrent jurisdiction. 
SEXUAL ASSAULT IN INDIAN COUNTRY 
 One out of every three American Indian women is a victim 
of rape at least once in her lifetime.10  Approximately 7.2 out of 
1,000 American Indian women fall victim to sexual assault, com-
pared to 1.9 out of 1,000 of all other races in the United States.11  
Some American Indians and national researchers believe that 
even though statistics reflect an alarming rate of sexual violence 
in Indian Country, the rate of sexual assault is not truly represen-
tative of the problem due to underreporting.12   
The symptoms facilitating sexual assault are similar for 
women of all races, such as general negative social attitudes to-
ward women, the relative lack of power held by women in soci-
ety in contrast to men, and the traditional sexual subjugation of 
women.13  American Indian women, however, experience unique 
socio-economic disadvantages as they not only endure sexism by 
male-dominated tribal councils, but also struggle to overcome 
common social problems that accompanied the imposition of the 
white patriarchal paradigm during colonialism.14  Furthermore, 
as victims of sexual assault, there are specific cultural impedi-
ments that obstruct their access to helpful resources.15  The con-
sequences of these barriers are often uniquely worse than those 
of their female counterparts of other ethnicities.16  The estab-
lished disenfranchisement of American Indians, and particularly 
the treatment of American Indian women by colonizers, is the 
root of this disadvantage.17  This past oppression has led to se-
vere present day repercussions for American Indians, and spe-
cifically for American Indian women. 
In March 2004, responding to reports of sexual assault in 
Indian Country, Senators Tom Daschle and Tim Johnson called 
for legal reform to increase funding for tribes as part of an ag-
gressive effort to combat the rates of sexual assault in Indian 
Country.18  The senators criticized cuts in tribal programs fund-
ing, and challenged President Bush to re-evaluate the needs of 
Indian Country.  The federal government, however, has yet made 
an effort to correct the problems that the Senators’ addressed in 
their letter.   
THE FEDERAL TRUST RESPONSIBILITY 
In practice, the federal trust responsibility requires Congress 
to allocate tribal funds directly to protect tribal lands, to enhance 
tribal resources and self-government, to ensure the welfare of the 
tribes and people, and to guarantee American Indian use and 
enjoyment of tribal lands.19  The trust principles governing pri-
vate fiduciaries equally apply to the federal government’s trust 
duty to the tribes.20  Courts maintain that a “fiduciary relation-
ship necessarily arises when the Government assumes elaborate 
control over resources . . .  and property belonging to Indians” 
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and the elements of the common-law trust exist.21  Essentially, 
as a trustee to tribal land and money, the federal government is 
bound to a strict duty of undivided loyalty under the tenets of 
trust principles.22   
Nonetheless, no single explicit statutory definition of the 
federal trust responsibility exists.23  Rather, the central body of 
contemporary federal trust policy derives from a composite of 
the Constitution, legislative enactments, tribal treaties with the 
American government, and most importantly, judicial deci-
sions.24  The courts utilize all of these sources of law in deter-
mining the parameters of the federal government’s duties.    
TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY 
The foundational framework for the interpretation of Indian 
law and tribal sovereignty is in Johnson v McIntosh,25 the first of 
three opinions written by Chief Justice Marshall in the nine-
teenth century.26  The Court in Johnson approved of the federal 
government’s claim of title to American Indian land, despite the 
absence of agreement or consent from American Indians.27  
Chief Justice Marshall determined that rather than being abso-
lute sovereign entities empowered with inherent rights such as 
the right to transfer title to land, tribes were “dependent, dimin-
ished sovereigns.”28  Marshall echoed this interpretation of tribal 
sovereignty in his second opinion written in Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia.29   
Finally, in Worcester v. Georgia, the Court slightly broke 
with precedent by elaborating that Indian tribes are “distinct, 
independent political communities, retaining their original natu-
ral rights” in matters of local self-government.30  Essential to the 
Court’s holding is the narrow construction of tribal independ-
ence as limited to “local self-government.”31  In the aftermath of 
the Marshall trilogy, Indian tribes maintain sovereignty only 
over affairs that occur within their tribal communities, and only 
over affairs among American Indians.   
CONCURRENT CRIMINAL JURISDICTION SCHEME IN   
INDIAN COUNTRY 
In general, tribal courts retain concurrent jurisdiction with 
both federal and state courts to enforce laws in Indian Country, 
with the federal courts reserving jurisdiction to enforce all fed-
eral criminal laws.32  However, tribal courts traditionally have 
criminal jurisdiction only over offenses that Indians commit in 
Indian Country.  In 1834, Congress enacted the General Crimes 
Act, extending federal criminal jurisdiction to crimes between 
Indians and non-Indians.33  The Act generally reinforces the 
fundamental concept of tribal self-government by asserting that 
crimes between Indians fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
tribal governments.  Additionally, the Act upholds the notion of 
tribal sovereignty by explicitly excluding federal criminal juris-
diction over Indian offenders tried and punished by the tribal 
courts.34   
Congress further expanded its jurisdiction and enacted the 
Major Crimes Act, creating federal criminal jurisdiction over 
more serious felonies that Indians commit in Indian Country.35  
The Major Crimes Act also only permits tribal courts to impose 
punishments of a maximum of one year imprisonment and a fine 
of five thousand dollars.36  Perceiving a lack of proficient law 
enforcement in Indian Country, Congress subsequently passed 
Public Law 280.37  This legislation requires six states to assume 
criminal and civil jurisdiction over all or part of Indian Country 
within their borders, and provides that both the General Crimes 
Act and the Major Crimes Act are not applicable in these six 
states.  According to Public Law 280, these states retain author-
ity over non-Indians in Indian country, including crimes that 
non-Indians commit against Indians on tribal lands.  A lack of 
clarity in the law, however, results in an interpretation of the 
General Crimes Act that preempts state criminal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians committing crimes against Indians, thereby 
preserving federal criminal jurisdiction over these cases.38  
THE TRUST RESPONSIBILITY DYNAMIC IN                  
INDIAN COUNTRY 
There are two overlapping factors predominantly responsi-
ble for the lack of protection of American Indian women.  First, 
Congress’ consistent violation of its trust responsibility con-
stricts the level of sovereignty afforded to tribal governments 
and courts and simultaneously increases the need for tribal de-
pendence on the federal government.39  Second, jurisdictional 
confusions and enforcement flaws due to the changing roles of 
the federal and state governments, result in the hindrance of 
tribal justice system development, deny American Indian 
women equal protection of the laws, and further exacerbate In-
dian Country struggles to achieve sovereignty.40  Consequently, 
the everyday social experiences of American Indians, and spe-
cifically American Indian women, reveals a continued plight, 
which exists on the periphery of American consciousness.  
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HABITUALLY ABANDONS 
ITS TRUST RESPONSIBILITIES 
The President and Congress seem to regard their duties un-
der the trust agreement as an optional, rather than as a manda-
tory legal obligation.  The federal government must either begin 
fulfilling its trust duties or take specific measures to divest tribal 
funds by returning what belongs to American Indians.  In other 
words, the federal government would have to make appropriate 
reparations for damages caused as a result of its fiduciary 
breach.41  As the trustee and the possessor of title to Indian lands 
and monies, the federal government has the obligation of pro-
tecting the interests of Indian Country.42  However, past govern-
mental actions reflect an abandonment of its obligations to the 
trust beneficiaries, i.e., to American Indians.43  In having a 
“dependent nation” within its borders, undoubtedly the federal 
government’s ancillary motivation is to maintain maximum con-
trol of Indian Country.44  To effectuate this goal, the federal 
government entered into a trust, whereby it ascertains physical 
control of tribal lands, then asserts its constitutionally-vested 
 
authority to restrict tribal sovereignty and self-governance.45 
Regardless of the federal government’s motives and consti-
tutionally-vested authority, the law recognizes that when a trus-
tee fails to administer a trust pursuant to the terms of the agree-
ment, a breach results, subjecting the trustee to liability for dam-
ages as well as other available remedies.46  In Seminole Nation 
v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the 
federal government disbursed tribal funds to the local tribal gov-
ernment, completely aware that the government was not allocat-
ing funds according to its appropriate, intended purposes.47  The 
Court reasoned that the trust requires the federal government to 
strictly adhere to its obligations as Indian Country’s fiduciary 
agent, utilizing tribal money and land to advance social develop-
ment and promote tribal self-governance.48  The federal govern-
ment’s behavior in Indian Country demonstrates its continued 
failure to provide trust funding necessary to raise the standard of 
living and social well-being of American Indians.  In addition, 
misallocation of money, as well as insufficient or declining lev-
els of funding, force impoverished female victims of sexual as-
sault to struggle with limited options and resources for help.49   
In a similar vein, Congress passed the Violence Against 
Women Act (VAWA) to provide federal protection to women as 
victims of violent crimes.50  Although some provisions in 
VAWA addressed American Indian women specifically, these 
sections did not offer decisive solutions to the serious problem 
of sexual assault faced by American Indian women.51  There-
fore, during VAWA’s reauthorization in 2000, there was an ini-
tiative to create a discretionary grant program to support non-
profit tribal coalitions that provide services for victims of sexual 
assault and domestic violence in Indian Country.52  In determin-
ing that only tribal governments could receive federal funding, 
the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Office on Violence Against 
Women informed the tribal coalitions that they were ineligible 
to apply for funding.53  The tribal governments, however, did 
not receive direct funding from the DOJ.  Therefore, these tribal 
coalitions will likely dissolve because tribal governments lack 
sufficient funding to allocate money to these programs.   
Congress acknowledged that funding shortfalls are likely 
the biggest impediment to tribal self-determination.54  If tribal 
self-determination and self-governance truly are goals that the 
federal government shares with Indian Country, then the govern-
ment should not simply recognize that adequate funding makes 
independence possible, but actually allocate money to these pro-
grams.55  In violation of trust responsibilities, however, the 
President and Congress continue to fall short of providing 
“resources necessary to effectively address or remedy [such] 
longstanding problems in Indian Country” as disproportionate 
rates of sexual assault.56   
THE FEDERAL TRUST AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR        
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION 
These cyclic arguments about how concurrent jurisdiction 
preserves tribal autonomy, and how the United States’ policy of 
recognizing tribal sovereignty and self-government demands the 
existence of concurrent jurisdiction, does no justice to the true 
nature of the situation.57  The U.S. Supreme Court in Mitchell v. 
United States offered the rationalization that, by virtue of the 
trust agreement, tribal governments relegate some relative con-
trol to Congress in exchange for its protections and support.58  
The fiduciary arrangement of the federal trust agreement does 
not implicate a legally cognizable justification for limiting the 
ability of either a tribal government or a court to regulate inter-
nal affairs.59   
Although the initial framing of the relationship between the 
government and tribes is like a guardian to its ward, the more 
fitting paradigm is created under the laws of trust.60  Under the 
guardian and ward paradigm, there is an assumption that the 
ward is incapable of managing its own affairs, or actually has no 
say in those affairs.61  In contrast, the purpose of the trust agree-
ment is to empower tribes and to fortify the development of po-
litical and legal systems capable of assuming the role of manag-
ing tribal affairs.62  Again, common-law trust doctrine prohibits 
trustees from taking actions that result in a personal advantage 
or gain if that action harms its beneficiary.63  In implementing 
the concurrent jurisdiction scheme, Congress perpetuated its 
dominion over Indian country to the detriment of tribal self-
government.  
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION DENIES AMERICAN INDIAN 
WOMEN EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW 
American Indian women have neither equivalent levels of 
protection nor equitable avenues of legal reprisal in Indian 
Country because the U.S. federal government makes the arbi-
trary jurisdictional distinction between tribal members and non-
tribal members.64  The laws as they exist in Indian Country, as 
well as the scope of enforcement of these laws, differ arbitrarily 
in contrast to the laws that govern non-tribal members.65  It 
would be difficult for the federal government to devise a basis 
for permitting a lack of equity in legal protection such as what 
currently exists in Indian Country.66  Because the federal gov-
ernment marks jurisdictional boundaries along the status of 
tribal membership, sexual violence against American Indian 
women persists at higher rates than for women in other parts of 
the country.67   
Statistics estimate that 70% of the American Indian victims 
of rape or sexual assault reported to an offender of a different 
race indicates an inherent flaw in Congress’ denial of tribal au-
thority to prosecute non-Indian assailants.68  The number of 
American Indian women who suffer from sexual assaults is dra-
matic to the extent that there is likely a deeper systemic catalyst 
than just the social and economic differences that these women 
face.  Socio-economic distinctions between American Indian 
women and women of other races provide no discernable, com-
plete explanation for the staggering disparity in incidents of sex-
ual assault among Indian women compared to incidents involv-
ing victims of other races.69   
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The only evident justification for this arbitrary racial classi-
fication is the United States’ interest in protecting non-Indians, 
because there is no substantiation of Indian protection reflected 
in these laws.70  Rather, in advancing this interest, it seems that 
the measures this statute takes severely undermine the protection 
of the true victims in these crimes, with no inclination of a com-
pelling governmental interest.71  This is particularly true with a 
crime like sexual assault because there is an indefinite extent of 
mental injury accompanying the physical pain and torment.72  It 
seems senseless to limit what crimes can be enforced, and then 
bind the scope of enforcement almost arbitrarily to the point of 
rendering the punishment ineffective in deterring the crime.73     
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD ABANDON ITS 
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION POLICY AND EMPOWER 
TRIBES TO REGULATE ALL AFFAIRS ON TRIBAL LANDS 
In Duro v. Reina, the Supreme Court expressly stated that 
the notion of non-Indian implied consent to tribal criminal juris-
diction is invalid, but there was no clear explanation for the 
Court’s decision.74  The Court simply dismissed the possibility 
of implied consent by stating “nonmembers who share relevant 
jurisdictional characteristics of non-Indians, should share the 
same jurisdictional status.”75  This vague statement seems to 
mean that non-members are only subjected to laws outside of the 
sphere of local tribal governments.  Unsurprisingly, the Court 
did not consider the potentially negative implications resulting 
from its logically defunct interpretations of tribal sovereignty.76 
The authority to oversee sexual assault claims when the vic-
tim is a member of the tribe is necessary to protect internal rela-
tions,77  especially when considering the clashing cultural dy-
namics of Indian Country.78  For example, American Indian 
women may be hesitant to report assaults because law enforce-
ment and sexual assault specialists generally are outsiders, much 
like the criminals that assault them.79  About 70 % of the re-
ported crimes in Indian Country are reported to non-Indians.80   
The other likely cause of underreporting is that even when 
acknowledged, there is no heavy pursuit of sexual assault assail-
ants, mainly because the criminals are non-Indian and thus able 
to escape through the perforated holes in the confusing concur-
rent jurisdiction scheme.81  As a result of this aspect of the judi-
cial system, the general sentiment among American Indian 
women is that not only will response to reports take an unduly 
long time, but that no semblance of justice will result because 
American Indians see non-Indians as a privileged class on tribal 
lands.82  In considering cultural implications, concurrent jurisdic-
tion reinforces the subjugated mentality ingrained in the con-
sciousness of American Indians for centuries, which makes it 
more difficult to create a bridge of trust between American Indi-
ans and non-tribal members,83 and ultimately weakens commu-
nity ties within tribes.84 
Sexual assault directly affects internal relations in small 
American Indian communities where the strength and continuity 
of the community is dependent upon the individual’s sense of 
connectedness.85  American Indian tribes subscribe to communal 
values as the guiding principles for the laws that govern an indi-
vidual’s conduct.86  This preference does not mean that the group 
ignores individual interests.  Rather, American Indian laws strive 
to protect individuals, while at the same time, preserving the 
cultural beliefs and practices of the collective framework.87  
Thus, tribes build their society based on community and rela-
tional functions.88  In the context of this social structure, it is 
impractical to have an outside force dictating which rights and 
values should exist in Indian Country.89  The impracticality of 
such a relationship is especially apparent when the imposing 
force is foreign to the established relationships within the com-
munity and the shared common historical experience that contex-
tualizes the existing values and norms of that society.90   
In the abstract, American jurisprudence is a reflection of 
socially intrinsic values, based upon our historically bound ex-
periences and common motivations.91  The commonality of val-
ues and perceptions among most American Indian tribes stands 
in stark contrast from those values and views historically im-
posed by the majority culture in the United States.92  Therefore, 
preservation of the sanctity of the American Indian community is 
only possible when the laws reflect the communal values of In-
dian Country and not the values of a foreign society or main-
stream America.93  Ultimately, court interpretations of tribal sov-
ereignty frequently limit the reach of tribal authority, opting in-
stead to grant deference to the plenary powers of Congress, 
which facially remain insensitive to the true needs of tribal com-
munities.   
CONCLUSION 
The disproportionate rate of sexual assault in Indian Country 
is a product of the federal government abandoning its trust re-
sponsibilities and implementing its arbitrary and confusing con-
current jurisdiction policies.  Pursuant to its trust responsibility, 
the federal government and its agencies must not adopt or prom-
ulgate practices or regulations that compromise their fiduciary 
duties.94  The trustee must always act in the interests of the bene-
ficiaries.95  Indian Country needs a firmer adherence by the fed-
eral government to the true nature of its trust responsibility.  This 
would entail an abandonment of the current jurisdiction scheme 
in which tribal courts are powerless to effectuate the laws of 
their own land and equal protection eludes victims of sexual as-
sault.   
With the power to perpetuate and enforce the laws, tribal 
dependence on the federal government will diminish.  Although 
it is apparent that this is exactly what the federal government 
does not want, with the demise of concurrent jurisdiction, un-
doubtedly a decline in the existing problems in Indian Country, 
such as the rampant episodes of sexual assault, will ensue.  Al-
though this phenomenon probably comes as no surprise to the 
victims,96 it is difficult to find adequate justification for its per-
petuation.  
The federal government’s jurisdiction prior to Public Law 
280 and the states’ jurisdiction following its passage are too 
broad and conflict with the concept of tribal self-government as 
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well as the historically acknowledged characterization of Indian 
Country as a sovereign nation.97  If Indian sovereignty predates 
that of the United States, then it inherently follows that many 
actions of the United States, however justifiable within the rela-
tive historical, social, or legal context, serve as limitations on 
Indian sovereignty.98  Consequently, any claims of preserving 
the inherent powers of Indian self-government99 are fundamen-
tally flawed in that the federal government only protects those 
powers of self-government it creates and grants.100  True sover-
eignty, and thus true self-government, cannot exist where an-
other entity dictates and maintains the authority to interpret and 
redefine its scope.101  Ultimately, tribal courts and tribal law 
enforcement are essential institutions of tribal self-
government.102  Tribal self-government falters when these insti-
tutions are not exclusively within the dominion of the tribe.103 
The existence of concurrent jurisdiction through Public Law 
280 also violates the federal trust agreement by exacerbating 
tribal rights to self-government.104  Concurrent jurisdiction only 
preserves the interests of the federal government.105  Unfortu-
nately, as a result of repeated subjugation, a constant denial of 
the assertion of its rights, and the federal government’s inability 
and reluctance to legitimize tribal self-government,106 Indian 
Country is deficient in its ability to hold the federal government 
accountable.107  
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